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The aim of this contribution is to briefly consider and compare the various 
avenues followed in the Netherlands and South Africa in achieving the desired 
protection of fundamental rights, and ultimately good governance. These legal 
systems are chosen as both follow quite different routes to securing such 
protection, thereby inviting the question whether their different approaches are 
justified? The comparison will be conducted by comparing both legal systems 
as to the source of the rights protected, the character of such rights and the loci 
of protection within each system. But first the idea of fundamental rights 
protection is explored below in laying the groundwork for comparing the 
Netherlands and South Africa. 
 
 
2 Fundamental rights protection as a common good 
Good governance is increasingly placed on the agenda in modern societies. 
This is also true as far as the study of law is concerned. Gone are the days 
when the focus of academic endeavour simply rested on a thorough study of 
institutions, simply 'governance' if you will. The emphasis has shifted from an 




                                            
* Dr Gerhard van der Schyff, BA LLB LLM (Rand Afrikaans University) PhD (Antwerp). 
Lecturer in the Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Tilburg University, 
The Netherlands. 
1  See also Hatchard et al Comparative Constitutionalism 2. 
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For example, the nineteenth century liberal rechtsstaat may have been a 
vehicle with which to secure legality, namely the requirement that all state 
action must have a foundation in law, but it failed to ensure the integrity of the 
laws passed.2 In this regard one only has to recall the Second World War and 
the atrocities committed which were often sanctioned by some or other law 
produced by the corrupted German rechtsstaat.3
In other words, the liberal rechtsstaat with its emphasis on the technical nature 
of laws was complemented by a deep concern as to the nature of such laws. 
This deep concern for the justifiability of the content of laws can be identified as 
the material rechtsstaat.
 The fact that a norm can 
technically be identified as a law is no longer good enough. This is also clearly 
evidenced by the shift after the War to fundamental rights protection as a 
common good. It was realised, more than ever before, that laws not only had to 
satisfy the formal requirements of legality, but cardinally also the substantive 
requirements of legitimacy.  
 
4  The rechtsstaat, declaring the supremacy of law, not 
only had to ensure that laws were properly passed, but also that they respected 
certain minimum notions of justice. The latter is something which could no 
longer be left to the good will and discretion of the designated lawgiver, even if 
it was democratically legitimated. The 'good society' was no longer simply the 
concern of politics, but became increasingly a point of debate and contestation 
before the courts, especially in the form of fundamental rights.5
The acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948 set the tone for 
more awareness and activism in respect of basic rights, not only at the 
international level but also at the national level, not only in parliament but also 
  
 
                                            
2  Van Eikema Hommes 1978 TSAR 45-46; Zoethout Rechtsstaat 59-60. 
3  Stern 1981 TSAR 245-245 speaks in this context of the Rechtsstaat being turned into a 
Gesetzesstaat. 'Recht' is then intended to mean law as morally justifiable, while 'Gesetz' is 
intended to mean legal rules devoid of any moral authority. 
4  Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty 66-67; Van Eikema Hommes supra n 2 at 46-47; 
Zoethout supra n 2 at 60-63. 
5  Cf Troper 2003 Int'l J of Constitutional Law 99; Cappelletti 1992 TSAR 265-266; Venter 
Constitutional Comparison 81-84; Adams Recht en Democratie 105-142. 
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in court.6 This said, it is important to note that different societies approach the 
prominence of fundamental rights by quite often radically different means. The 
'good society' mindful of fundamental rights cannot be achieved by some or 
other fixed magic formula, but is influenced by various tensions and needs. 
However, one thing stands clear; there can be no 'good society' without such a 
thing as 'society'. Good governance by means of fundamental rights protection 
must aim to defend society against the state.7 Freedom is negated where 
society, as the sum total of human endeavour, is collapsed in the state, as the 
means with which to govern such endeavour.8
3 The Netherlands and South Africa compared  
 This is precisely the justification 
for fundamental rights, namely constructs aimed at delineating a free society in 
the face of government regulation and intervention. But although the notion of 
fundamental rights may be near universal, its practice is quite different, as will 
transpire below from the experience of the Netherlands and South Africa. 
 
 
Generally the protection of rights can be situated between two poles, these 
being the political and judicial.9 In other words, who has the final say as to the 
protection of rights, the courts or parliament? Prior to the Second World War 
the emphasis rested on the political protection of rights, or the parliamentary 
model as it is also sometimes called.10
The Netherlands, under the influence of the French Revolution with its 
emphasis on popular legitimacy and its distrust of higher law applied by judges, 
 The supreme interpreter of human rights 
was the political voice of the electorate, and often only that voice. Courts were 
expected to apply the law and not to shape it. This was also the tradition in both 
the Netherlands and South Africa.  
 
                                            
6  See generally on the this awareness and the development of the theory of rights Burkens 
Algemene Leerstukken 1-12, 27-45; Rautenbach and Malherbe Constitutional Law 291-
292; De Meij and Van der Vlies Inleiding 260. 
7  Van Eikema Hommes supra n 2 at 44-45; Pierson Modern State 50-77. 
8  Böckenförde supra n 4 at 155-157; Van der Schyff Concept van Democratie 553. 
9  See generally Sadurski 2002 Oxford J of Legal Studies 275. 
10  See Koopmans Courts 15-34 who expands on the parliamentary model by reference to the 
United Kingdom. 
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followed a route of parliamentary supremacy.11 The same can be said of South 
Africa, which drawing heavily on the Westminster and common law tradition 
focused on the protection of rights by private law means.12
The Netherlands with its civil law focus viewed rights very much as part and 
parcel of public law; this is evidenced by the piecemeal inclusion of 
fundamental rights in the Constitution since the nineteenth century culminating 
in the grand revision of 1983.
 South Africans were 
not protected by a bill of rights, but by private law constructions translating 
rights and a sovereign parliament that enjoyed full responsibility for the integrity 
of the laws it passed. Both systems therefore saw much faith placed in 
parliament as the ultimate guardian of rights. There is however a difference to 
be noted here.  
 
13 The question centred though on who had to 
interpret that aspect of public law; the arrived answer being parliament. South 
Africa on the other hand never knew entrenched fundamental rights; 
constitutional law was seen as 'positive morality' under the influence of John 
Austin’s thought and not as 'positive law'.14
This view, namely of rights being solely political instruments, was held for a 
long time in South Africa, and as is generally known, also the source of great 
strife.
 The effect was essentially the same 
– rights were in essence political tools and not so much judicial tools. 
 
15
                                            
11  See on the French Revolution and its effect on judicial review Cappelletti Judicial Process 
193-194; Brewer-Carias Judicial Review 64-67. 
12  See generally on the protection of rights under common law Jayawickrama Judicial 
Application 98-109; Doyle and Wells Common Law 17. 
13  The current Dutch Constitution is a revised version of the document that was originally 
adopted in 1814 bringing about the restoration after the Napoleonic era. The country has 
therefore not known various constitutions, but one document that sees revision from time 
to time. The last comprehensive revision took place in 1983. The Constitution must be 
distinguished from the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1953 that forges the 
union between the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. See Kortmann and 
Bovend’ Eert Kingdom of the Netherlands 12-13. 
14  See Austin Province of Jurisprudence (first published in 1832). 
15  Venter supra n 5 at 74-79. 
 The white minority dominated the political apparatus and effectively the 
rights of the black majority for much of the country’s history in the twentieth 
century. The racial discrimination this engendered and the consequent protests, 
both nationally and internationally, fired the country’s democratisation from the 
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1980s onwards culminating in the constitutional settlement of the 1990s with 
the adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993 and the final Constitution in 
1996.16 A settlement which saw rights taking a prominent place in the new 
order. This prominence was grounded by the fact that the courts were called to 
enforce rights, thereby opting for what can be termed the constitutional model 
instead of the parliamentary model.17
The Netherlands, on the other hand, has not known so much opposition to 
accepting the idea of the judicial review of legislation in the light of fundamental 
rights as was the case in South Africa.
 No longer were judges deemed to be the 
mechanical appliers of the law, but they were enjoined to investigate the 
constitutional legitimacy of government action affecting rights. 
 
18
3.1 Source of rights 
 Instead the real question centres to a 
certain extent on deciding the source of the rights which are to be used as 
benchmarks for review, namely should one settle for national or international 
rights? This is explained below. 
 
The proper protection of fundamental rights is not only a question of whether 
rights are to be enforced by the judiciary, but importantly also relates to where 
such rights are to be found. Different systems follow different rules of 
recognition when it comes to locating the rights to which the bearers may lay 
claim. Globalisation has played a large role in this respect. People not only look 
across national boundaries for employment and financial opportunities, but 
increasingly also for their rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights set 
the trend in 1948, a trend which has known an explosion in recent years when it 
comes to treaties guaranteeing rights. The traditional setting of rights, namely 
                                            
16  The interim Constitution of South Africa (including its Bill of Rights) was adopted in 1993 
and came into force in 1994, it paved the way for the final Constitution (including its Bill of 
Rights) which was adopted in 1996 and came into effect in 1997. References to the South 
African Constitution must be taken to mean the final Constitution, unless the contrary can 
be deduced. For a general overview see Bouckaert 1997 Stanford J of Int'l L 375. 
17  See Koopmans supra n 10 at 35-62 who expands on the constitutional model by reference 
to the US. 
18  See Van Houten Zicht op Wetgeving; Adams and Van der Schyff 2006 ZaöRV for 
overviews. 
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national bills of rights is certainly not waning, but is faced by a competition of 
sorts when burgeoning international sources are taken into account.  
 
3.1.1 International protection 
Good governance by means of rights protection is far from being solely a 
national matter nowadays. This raises interesting questions as to the relation 
between national and international human rights regimes. These questions are 
solved differently from state to state, however two main possibilities can be 
identified. International law, including its accompanying human rights 
guarantees, can have direct effect in a national legal order or can enjoy effect 
only after having been transformed from international to national law.19 The first 
option, monism, is characteristic of the Dutch legal system, whereas the 
second, dualism, is characteristic of the South African order. This characteristic 
of the Dutch legal system has its foundations in unwritten constitutional law, 
while the Constitution on its part places a duty on the judiciary in section 94 not 
to apply national legal provisions where and to the extent these conflict with 
international law.20 International law is thus hierarchically superior to national 
law, including the Constitution.21
This stands in contrast to the South African position where the Constitution is 
always superior to international law, which in principle has to be enacted as 
national law before it may be applied by the courts.
  
 
22 A conflict between a 
transformed treaty and the South African Constitution is resolved by following 
the latter, this is also the case when a conflict arises between the Constitution 
and customary international law.23
                                            
19  Jayawickrama supra n 12 at 95-97. 
20  S 94 of the Dutch Constitution states that: “Legislative provisions in force within the 
Kingdom shall not be applicable if their application is in conflict with provisions of treaties 
that are binding on all persons or in conflict with resolutions adopted by international 
institutions.” See Dölle and Engels Constitutionele Rechtspraak 51-52; Burkens et al 
Democratische Rechtsstaat 331. 
21  Taekema (ed) Understanding Dutch Law 21. 
22  An exception was created in s 231(4) of the Constitution for self-executing treaties. See 
Olivier 2003 TSAR 495 who argues that parliament should indicate what it regards as self-
executing; otherwise the courts would have to determine the question. 
23  S 232 of the South African Constitution. 
 Whereas the Dutch system opts to turn to 
international law as its highest source of human rights, the South African 
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dispensation chooses to place its faith in the national constitution. This does not 
mean to say though international law is disregarded in South Africa – far from it 
actually. Section 39(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights enjoins courts, tribunals and fora 
to take international law into account when interpreting the Bill’s provisions, this 
obligation is also not limited to binding international law.24 While section 233 of 
the Constitution states that courts must prefer a reasonable interpretation of 
legislation that accords with international law to alternative interpretations that 
are inconsistent with international law. In practice judicial decisions in South 
Africa often refer to international law for guidance, while international law is 
pleaded frequently in Dutch courts to trump national provisions.25
3.1.2 National protection 
 International 
law clearly plays an important part in protecting human rights in both countries, 
but in very different ways. The Netherlands prefers a direct and superior role for 
international law, while the South African situation calls for international law to 
be considered, but never at the expense of the Constitution. 
 
The situation is also very different between the two legal systems when the role 
of fundamental rights guaranteed at national level is compared. The 
Netherlands saw a gradual development of the guarantees entrenched in the 
Constitution since the nineteenth century, which ultimately culminated in the 
constitutional revision of 1983 and the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights.26
 
 South Africa, in contrast, never knew fundamental rights 
provisions in its various constitutions. This met with an abrupt change in the 
1990s with the onset of the country’s democratisation. Both the interim and final 
Constitutions boasted Bills of Rights, importantly these bills were also 
enforceable by the judiciary. This stands in stark contrast to the Constitutions of 
1909, 1961 and 1983 which did not include express bills of rights and were 
either silent when it came to the judiciary applying the constitution or even 
forbade it, thereby affirming parliamentary sovereignty.  
                                            
24  S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR (CC), 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), par 35; Rautenbach and 
Malherbe supra n 6 at 42. 
25  See Hovell and Williams 2005 Melbourne University LR 131. 
26  See Akkermans, Bax and Verhey Grondrechten 35. 
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Although the Netherlands knew a bill of rights since the nineteenth century the 
Constitution saw the inclusion of a bar in 1848 to the judiciary reviewing 
compliance with constitutional provisions, so confirming the supremacy of 
parliament. This prohibition, which is at present contained in section 120, has 
become a standard feature of the Dutch Constitution and has survived the 
document’s numerous revisions.27 Its effect is to prohibit the judiciary from 
testing whether acts of parliament comply with the rights in the Constitution or 
the procedure prescribed for the enactment of such laws.28 However, section 
120 does not prevent the judiciary from reviewing laws of a lesser status than 
acts of parliament, such as delegated legislation and provincial and local 
ordinances, for constitutional compliance so long as such an inquiry does not 
implicitly review an act of parliament in the process.29 The idea was to allow the 
judiciary some measure of review, while still protecting parliament’s primacy in 
passing acts. Reality, as almost always, took on a different shape. This is 
because the judiciary increasingly reviewed legislation, including acts of 
parliament, for compliance with international law, thereby denting parliament’s 
legislative supremacy.30
This anomaly in Dutch law of judicial review in respect of international law, but 
only of laws of a lesser status than acts of parliament when the Constitution is 
at stake, has gained widespread criticism.
 One could say that international developments 
outpaced national recalcitrance. This again highlights a difference with the 
South African situation, where parliament’s supremacy was decidedly broken in 
the 1990s and not simply watered down as is the case in the Netherlands.  
 
31
                                            
27  S 120 of the Dutch Constitution reads: “The constitutionality of acts of parliament and 
treaties shall not be reviewed by the judiciary.” See Sap Netherlands Constitution 18-19; 
Hirsch Ballin Constitutionele Toetsing 47-67; Dölle and Engels supra n 20 at 15-20; 
Burkens et al supra n 20 at 184-191. 
28  Hoge Raad 27 January 1961, NJ 1961, 248 (annotated by DJ Veegens); Hoge Raad, 14 
April 1989, NJ 1989, 469 (annotated by M Scheltema); Van Houten supra n 18 at 41, 68-
73. 
29  Van Houten supra n 18 at 80-85, 239-241. The idea behind this construction is that 
parliament has sufficient procedural guarantees and democratic legitimacy to conduct 
constitutional review by itself, something which is not always the case with other legislative 
authorities – such as government-made delegated legislation or ordinances made by 
decentralised authorities. 
30  This was of course a consequence of the doctrine of monism. 
31  See Van Houten supra n 18 at 241-256 in this regard. 
 For instance, a member’s bill is 
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currently being considered in the Senate, after its adoption by the Lower 
House, which would allow the judicial review of many, mostly classical, rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution.32 There are however grave doubts whether the 
proposal will pass the Senate, after which it would have to be passed again by 
both houses, but this time with a qualified majority of two-thirds.33
3.1.3 Justification 
 It then seems 
as if the current state of affairs will remain so for quite a bit longer. 
 
The above raises the question as to the justifiability of these very different 
avenues pursued in respecting fundamental rights. The one, namely Dutch, 
sees a wish to preserve parliament’s supremacy in respect of the Constitution, 
but sees it broken in respect of international law; while the other, South African, 
chooses to subject parliament to the judicially enforced Constitution and sees 
international law playing only an indirect role as an interpretative aid.  
 
It can be argued that these different routes to the protection of rights are 
justified by reference to their context. The strong arm of the judicial branch, as it 
were, was seen as necessary in South Africa in aiding the consolidation of a 
sound democratic system after having suffered legislative abuse for so long.34
                                            
32  Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28, 331, no 2. The bill would allow for 
deconcentrated review, in other words all judges would be allowed to review the 
constitutionality of acts of parliament and not only special constitutional judges. This in line 
with the judicial review of international law, which is also organised along deconcentrated 
lines. See also Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28, 331, no 9; Adams and Van 
der Schyff supra n 18 at 399. 
33  The Senate drafted a particularly negative report of the bill; see Eerste Kamer 
vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 28, 331, B. The report focuses on the separation of powers and 
reiterates that the democratically elected legislature has to take responsibility for the 
constitutionality of legislation and not the courts. 
34  See generally Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 8-10, who explain that constitutionalism in 
modern-day South Africa must entail judicial review, even though institutions such as 
parliament now enjoy legitimacy. This is because judicial review can serve to strengthen 
democracy which is one of the new dispensation’s foundational values. 
 
The need was felt to ensure that an over-concentration of power in one body 
was to be avoided, even if such a body is democratically elected in contrast to 
past parliaments. The Netherlands on the other hand never knew such a 
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decisive shift from one dispensation to another, thereby explaining its 
haphazard constitutional development over the years.35
However, one could still argue that judicial review of the Dutch Constitution 
should be allowed as a matter of principle.
  
 
36 In other words, good governance 
decrees such a document’s judicial review. Although there is much to be said 
for the principle, one could cast doubts on certain characteristics of the Dutch 
Constitution. The Constitution is a rather technical document, its human rights 
provisions focus on the division of power more so than on the quality of an 
interfering measure. For example, only one provision in the Bill of Rights, 
namely section 15(4) regarding the rights of detainees, provides for the 
principle of proportionality to be applied in measuring the justifiability of 
interferences with the right.37 Instead the Bill focuses on creating extensive 
delegation provisions in its various limitation clauses, by either allowing only 
parliament to limit a right or including the possibility of it delegating the capacity 
to other organs.38
                                            
35  See De Meij and Van der Vlies supra n 6 at 31-47 who sketch the relatively peaceful 
development of the Dutch state. 
36  Dölle and Engels supra n 20 at 75-80. 
37  S 15(4) of the Dutch Constitution holds that: “A person who has been lawfully deprived of 
his liberty may be restricted in the exercise of fundamental rights in so far as [‘so far as’ is 
taken to refer to a proportionality assessment] the exercise of such rights is not compatible 
with the deprivation of liberty.”  
38  For an overview of delegation in the Dutch Constitution see Burkens et al supra n 20 at 73, 
78-79, 133-134; De Meij and Van der Vlies supra n 6 at 127-132. 
  
 
In comparison the South African Constitution states in its general limitation 
clause contained in section 36(1) that a right may only be limited by a “law of 
general application”, thereby requiring legality but not restricting the state in its 
delegation to other organs of the capacity to set limits to rights. The rather 
technical Dutch approach should, arguably, only be viewed as important 
guidelines for parliament when considering new legislation, instead as hard and 
fast rules to be applied by the judiciary. This is the case as the strict judicial 
review of these intricate delegation provisions, which some may even call dated 
relics of the nineteenth century as to the mode of limitation, may obstruct 
efficient administration of the state by being too formalistic.  
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However, Dutch citizens on the other hand can still turn to international law for 
the substantive protection of their rights, an avenue which is closed in South 
Africa. This further difference is probably also justified. South Africa has to 
create and foster its own particular human rights culture in order to address its 
own past more so than the Netherlands, which can rely on a well developed 
regional system of protection in the form of the European Court of Human 
Rights, something which is still in its early stages in Africa. Again, the different 
approaches adopted in the Netherlands and South Africa can be understood, 
and probably accepted, by reference to each country’s constitutional 
development and particular characteristics. 
 
3.2 Character of rights 
 
The twentieth century has known something of a rights explosion. Not only has 
the awareness of rights increased but also the number of rights. Whereas the 
nineteenth century saw a decided focus on civil and political rights, classical 
rights in other words, the previous century saw a shift to include socio-
economic rights. The material rechtsstaat developed a new social dimension, 
not only does the focus of law rest on the organisation of the state and the 
accompanying political rights, but also on the quality of life within that state.39
In respect the expansion of the judicial function in South Africa in the 1990s 
was not limited to classical rights, but also extended to the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights. However this had more meaning under the final Bill of 
Rights of 1996 solidifying the country’s transition than under the interim Bill of 
Rights of 1993, as the latter did not include a 'full' declaration of both classical 
and socio-economic rights as was the case under the final Bill of Rights. The 
courts have then also made use of their new powers in reviewing compliance 
 
This had led to questions as to the role of the judiciary in regards to enforcing 
socio-economic rights.  
 
                                            
39  Burkens et al supra n 20 at 25-26; Stern supra n 3 at 246-248. 
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with the rights guaranteed in the final Bill. For example, the well-known decision 
of Grootboom attracted international attention and praise as a model example 
of courts investigating issues related to socio-economic rights.40 In this case the 
applicant and others were evicted from government land on which they 
squatted, but they were not provided with alternative accommodation thereby 
rendering them destitute. The court held that the government’s housing 
programme by not protecting those in desperate need of shelter did not 
adequately see to the 'progressive realisation' of the right to housing in section 
26 of the Bill of Rights.41
Such an approach to socio-economic rights is largely unheard of in the judicial 
world. Courts are generally accepted as arbiters of classical rights, but socio-
economic rights are still very much the preserve of legislatures. The argument 
is usually raised that courts are not equipped to investigate government policy 
in relation to social matters and should consequently pay deference to those 
elected to make such policy. This is also generally the case in the Netherlands. 
Although there exists no bright-line rule in this regard, courts usually hold that 
matters related to socio-economic rights are not for them to decide, but are 
mere policy instructions aimed at government and not hard law.
 The government was consequently called upon to 
provide the evicted people with emergency shelter.  
 
42 This reserve 
is far weaker when it comes to classical rights, as such rights are deemed as 
guaranteeing private spheres of state exclusion over which judges are 
competent.43
                                            
40  Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
See Malherbe 2005 ZöR 111; Klaaren Institutional Interpretation 105. 
41  S 26 of the South African Constitution provides that: “(1) Everyone has the right to access 
to adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.” 
42  Burkens et al supra n 20 at 138-139; Van der Roest Basisboek Recht 421; Prakke, De 
Reede and Van Wissen Handboek 381. 
43  De Meij and Van der Vlies supra n 6 at 263. 
 In other words, areas in which people are free to act and where 
the state has to withhold itself from action. This relies on the divide between 
action and inaction. Where the state is called upon to act, such as in the 
provision of socio-economic rights, the courts are reluctant to interfere; but 
where the state is called upon to refrain from action, such as is generally the 
case with classical rights, the courts are generally more inclined to investigate 
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the matter. This dichotomy has given much fuel for an at times heated 
academic debate as to the judicial enforceability of socio-economic rights in 
contrast to classical rights.44
Although one can on principle grounds advocate that socio-economic rights 
must be judicially enforced, this picture may change when the reality of a 
particular situation is considered. For example, the Netherlands is a highly 
developed country with an elaborate social welfare system. It is a society of 
little want in comparison to most other countries in the world. This enviable 
state of affairs has to date then also largely been the product of the political 
process. The introduction of social legislation on a large scale, starting in the 
1950s, came about by political imperative, not judicial imperative. In other 
words, there is no general feeling in the Netherlands that socio-economic rights 
are not to be entrusted to parliament or that the situation will radically change 
were the judiciary to enforce such rights. Politicians are perceived as probably 
better placed to make such decisions than judges.
  
 
The purpose of this contribution is however not to repeat this debate, but to 
venture some thoughts on the justifiability of the status quo in South Africa in 
comparison to that in the Netherlands regarding the character of rights and their 
judicial enforceability. In other words, is the fact that socio-economic rights are 
generally not enforced by the judiciary in the Netherlands justified, given the 
outspoken judicial interest in such rights in South Africa? The answer to this 
question is probably yes. 
 
45
South Africa on the other is undoubtedly also justified in having a judiciary 
which is called upon to test government policy in the socio-economic sphere. It 
may not be forgotten that South Africa knew a watershed moment, namely that 
between a society based on a supreme parliament that negated rights and a 
  
 
                                            
44  See generally Vlemminx Nieuw Profiel. 
45  See Burkens et al supra n 20 at 184 who explain that parliament is often perceived as 
being better placed to decide constitutional issues, as it is also responsible for adopting 
the Constitution in its guise as constitutional assembly. 
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dispensation based on a justiciable supreme constitution that treasures rights.46
3.3 Locus of protection 
 
The South African situation given its past experience with the over-
concentration of power in the legislative branch is rightfully wary of placing all 
its eggs in one basket as it were. Engaging the courts then seems to be a 
logical response to the country’s history. The great social need in South Africa 
could certainly also be mentioned as another reason as to why not only the 
legislative branch of the trias politica is to be engaged, but also the judicial 
branch. Simply put, the social project to be embarked upon is so large and 
important that the courts, as co-arbiters, may serve to help government in 
approaching such important matters from the right perspective.  
 
The locus of protection refers to the notion of a centrifugal point or force of 
fundamental rights protection within a particular system.47
                                            
46  New National Party of SA v Government of the RSA 1999 5 BCLR 489 (CC), 1999 3 SA 
191 (CC) par 120. 
47  The term locus of power is used often in literature on political science in tracing the source 
of political power in a state; here, however, it is used in the context of constitutional power. 
 Stated differently, 
where is the essence or core of a system’s concern for rights seated? Can a 
conditio sine qua non be identified without which fundamental rights protection 
in a particular legal system can simply not be imagined? In other words, a focal 
point of sorts in constituting the necessary protection of rights.  
 
It is clear from the above exposition of fundamental rights protection in the 
Netherlands and South Africa that different loci are at stake when it comes to 
securing such protection in both systems. For instance, the South African 
dispensation is a clear example of a system that knows one central point or 
locus of fundamental rights protection, namely the Constitution. The 
Constitution can be seen as the source document of not only the state and its 
institutions, but also of fundamental rights and their enforcement. Section 2 of 
the document makes this clear by stating that it is –  
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the supreme law of the republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.48
The locus of the protection of fundamental rights in the Netherlands is not a 
unitary but a composite one. Rights protection is not as focused on the 
Constitution and its dictates as is the case in South Africa, but is instead a joint 
venture between the Constitution, parliament and international law.
  
 
When studying fundamental rights protection in South Africa, the Constitution is 
to be viewed not only as the starting point, but also as the destination, as its 
provisions have the final say so to speak. This stands quite in contrast to the 
Dutch system.  
 
49 As a 
matter of fact, the debate has not been settled as to whether the Dutch 
parliament derives its legislative power from the Constitution or whether it may 
lay claim to inherent power.50
                                            
48  See Rautenbach and Malherbe supra n 6 at 24-25. 
49  See Van der Hoeven Plaats van de Grondwet passim; Kortmann and Bovend’ Eert supra n 
13 at 6; Kortmann and Bovend’ Eert Constitutioneel Recht 5 regarding the function and 
place of the Dutch Constitution in that country’s constitutional law. Sap supra n 27 at 42 
words it as follows: “Dutch constitutional law is not based on a single overriding principle.” 
50  This debate centres on s 81 of the Dutch Constitution, which provides that: “Acts of 
Parliament shall be passed jointly by the Government and the Parliament.” In other words, 
does the provision simply restate an established fact and further outline its procedure, or 
does it endow parliament (and the government) with such legislative powers?  
 The latter view obviously enhances parliament’s 
standing vis-à-vis constitutional authority and dictates, thereby diluting any 
centrifugal force. Furthermore, although the Constitution is an important source 
document, the role of parliament may also not be underestimated, as 
constitutional rights are often interpreted by using legislation as an 
interpretative aid. Moreover, when interpreting constitutional rights much also 
centres on the parliamentary preparatory work in drafting such provisions in 
order to stay true to the intention of the drafters. Add to the equation the weight 
of international law, both the possibility to invoke such law before domestic 
courts and the right to lodge applications with supranational courts, and the 
picture of rights protection becomes decidedly varied. A number of important 
forces work in on such protection from different angles, often in competition or 
congruence with each other, while the South African system takes on the form 
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of a neatly tailored system with the Constitution as its logical and supreme 
constituent inspiration.  
 
This difference also becomes clear when both countries’ court structures are 
considered. South Africa has a special constitutional court as final arbiter in all 
constitutional matters, not only in respect of lower courts bound by means of 
the doctrine of precedent, but also to parliament.51 The Netherlands on the 
other hand knows three highest domestic courts in constitutional matters, those 
being the Central Council of Appeal (Centrale Raad van Beroep) for civil 
servant matters and social security law, the Council of State (Raad van State) 
for administrative law and the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) for remaining 
matters.52
4 Conclusion 
 Add to this, institutions like the European Court of Human Rights and 
it quickly becomes clear that the locus of protection is not particularly 
centralised or hierarchically structured as is the case in South Africa. This is 
again the product of the fact that the Netherlands is a society characterised by 
a gradual expansion of fundamental rights protection, instead of a dispensation 
wishing to make a clean and decisive break with its past like South Africa. The 
Netherlands therefore never knew a pressing desire or need to focus the 
protection of rights as much as the South African experience. The result, 
namely human rights protection driven by a single force in South Africa is not 
emulated in the Netherlands where protection is driven by a number of largely 
separate forces coming together for a common purpose. This is indeed an 
important difference between the two systems, but undoubtedly justified seeing 
the difference in their constitutional development. 
 
 
There is clearly no single or perfect route to attainting the desired protection of 
fundamental rights. This becomes clear after having evaluated the situation in 
                                            
51  S 167 of the South African Constitution. See Rautenbach and Malherbe supra n 6 at 227, 
229-232. 
52  S 116, 118 of the Dutch Constitution; Wet van 9 maart 1962 op de Raad van State; Wet 
van 18 april 1827 op de samenstelling der rechterlijke macht en het beleid der justitie; De 
Blois Grondslagen 81; Brenninkmeijer Judicial Organization 49-56. 
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the Netherlands and South Africa. Both these countries adhere to very different 
views in giving shape to their dispensations. The focus should rest not so much 
on devising a one-size-fits-all formula, but instead on opting for what works 
within a particular context. One should however be careful not to lay too great a 
stress on context either. The protection of rights should still be sound, but 
tailored to meet different needs.  
 
As to what 'sound protection' exactly entails one can be more clear. 
Fundamental rights rest on respect for individual freedom. Individual freedom to 
conduct one’s private life as you choose; but also the freedom to make political 
choices. Political freedom ensures that democracy thrives, while personal 
freedom sets limits to what the democratic majority can expect from the rest of 
society and its members.53
                                            
53  The ECHR held similarly in Chassagnou v France of 29 April 1999 par 112: “Although 
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy 
does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be 
achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse 
of a dominant position.”  
 The South African experience is clearly one of a 
long and difficult struggle for a dispensation that enables such freedom, while 
the Dutch experience attests more of a gradual development seeking to find a 
delicate balance between the need to preserve tradition and embrace change. 
Both systems though are faced by the same challenge, namely that of ensuring 
that the right balance is continually struck between their state and society in 
guaranteeing real freedom. 
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